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Introduction 
Economic sanctions have become one of the most commonly used forms of 
coercive foreign policy within the world system, with their use increasing dramatically 
over that past few decades (Drezner, 1999). This trend is not at all surprising; economic 
sanctions allow leaders to negatively affect and, in some cases, force their will on other 
nation states without having to fire a single shot. As sanctions have become more widely 
used, they have become a major area of study within the international relations literature. 
As I will show, there is a strong divide within the academic community when it comes to 
the effectiveness of sanctions. The debate over the effectiveness of economic sanctions 
has, for the large part, dominated the sanctions literature for years. This debate has simply 
left IR scholars divided on the issue. But as the literature on economic sanctions has 
expanded, attention has shifted to trying to determine what factors directly affect sanction 
success, rather than the basic work or not work approach. I believe this is a logical shift. 
We need to spend less time debating if sanctions are effective, and more time trying to 
explain why we see some states able to withstand sanctions, while others cave quickly.  
I believe that the literature on the effects of natural resource wealth may explain 
some of the variation we see in sanction outcomes. Few if any scholars have looked at the 
effects of natural resources on the ability of sanctioned states to persevere the 
implementation of economic sanctions. Based on the common theory that black knights 
(or nations that continue to trade with sanctioned states) help increase the ability of states 
to withstand economic sanctions, as well as the literature on natural resources, we can 
assume that resource wealth can increase the ability of targeted states to overcome 
economic sanctions. The general idea is that outside nations will be willing to defy others 
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in the international community in order to have access to the resources a target state may 
have. This in turn should increase the likelihood of target states overcoming the use of 
economic sanctions against them.  
In the following, I will show that the current literature on the use of economic 
sanctions and natural resource wealth clearly points to the fact that natural resource 
wealth should have an effect on the ability of targeted states to survive the 
implementation of economic sanctions. I will break my argument into several sections. 
First I will explain how economic sanctions work and why it is important that we 
continue to devote time to studying them. I will show where the literature on economic 
sanctions and natural resource wealth stands today. I will then lay out a real world 
example. I will look at the case of Iran to help show the effects of resource wealth on 
sanction success. From there, I will present a theoretical argument that I will 
operationalize and test both quantitatively and qualitatively. By doing this, I believe I can 
further our understanding of how economic sanctions work and add to the current 
literature on the topic. 
The Importance of Economic Sanctions 
 In today’s world economic sanctions are an important tool at the disposal of world 
leaders, one that we see them using more and more often. Economic coercion is a very 
old and tested form of foreign policy. As Simons (1999) explains, the idea behind 
sanctions dates back to ancient times. Leaders of ancient armies would often cut off 
supplies to sieged cities; if carried out correctly, this sort of action would starve their 
enemies into submission and/or surrender. This proved to be a very successful tactic to 
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the skilled generals of the time. We also see sanctions having prominent roles in disputes 
throughout history. As Drezner (1999) points out, the Athenian boycott of Megara was a 
major factor in the lead up to the Peloponnesian war. Though things have changed quite a 
bit since the siege of Megara, the basic principle still stands today. The general goal of 
economic sanctions is to cause economic hardship to one’s enemies and force them to 
give into the will of the sender state(s). 
Economic sanctions have become a widely used tool by leaders of the powerful 
economies within the world system. Today, the United States is by far the largest user of 
economic sanctions. Drezner (1999) explains that between 1992 and 1996 the U.S. 
implemented economic sanctions a total of sixty times, against thirty-five different 
countries. He adds that these sanctions ended up affecting around 42 percent of the 
world’s population.  
Drezner (1999) also makes sure to point out that sanctions come with costs; 
during this time frame the U.S. lost about 20 million dollars in possible trade revenue. 
When sanctions are implemented, the targeted state (or state in which the sanctions are 
levied against) is not the only one to take on negative costs. The sender nation (or nation 
that implements the sanction) also loses potential revenue and trade that it could have 
acquired from trading with the targeted nation. This of course creates a costs vs. gains 
sort of analysis. Generally speaking the goal of sanction implementation is to force the 
targeted state(s) to give in first. 
Even with their potential costs, sanctions have become an attractive option for 
world leaders. The loss of revenues and/or possible trade is much more acceptable than 
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the loss of military personnel. Warfare is arguably not as acceptable to the citizens of the 
economic powers in Western Europe and North America. The use of economic sanctions 
allows state leaders to coerce and force their will on other nations without having to 
resort to more controversial military means (Allen, 2008; Davis and Engerman, 2003). 
Drezner (1999) concludes that economic power in today’s world is often as 
powerful as military might. Globalization has made the world a smaller place. The 
lowering cost of the mass transportation of goods has made trade in many cases cheaper 
than internal production of certain manufactured goods. This has increased the economic 
connection between states, leaving many very dependent on each other. More 
specifically, many in the developing world are very dependent on developed economies 
to provide them industrial goods. Basically, as economic ties increase so does the ability 
of states to hurt others by cutting off those avenues of trade. As anyone who studies 
international relations understands, power is the driving force within international 
relations. The one with the most power wins; it’s just the way the anarchical world 
system works. So if a nation has economic power, it can easily use that power to force its 
will on others.  
Generally speaking, the goal of the sender state is to cause a change in the 
domestic or international politics of the targeted state. Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott 
(1990) point out that in most cases total destruction is not the primary goal. Rather, they 
argue that sender states only wish to cause total governmental destabilization in around 
20 percent of cases. They contend that it is much more common for sender states to 
simply want a minor policy change in the targeted state. While most scholars agree with 
Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott’s (1990) assessment, others take a more negative outlook. 
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Scholars such as Nossal (1989) and Schwebach (2000) argue that states may use 
sanctions as a symbolic gesture, such as punishment or sending a clear message of 
disapproval to the international community. 
A major concern associated with the use of sanctions is that their negative effects 
will ultimately be passed on to the civilian population rather than the targeted state’s 
political actors. If this were to happen, the civilian population would suffer and bear the 
burden of the economic sanctions. Peksen (2011) argues that this can be the case. Even 
though sanctions clearly help lead to peaceful outcomes, they often have negative effects 
on the civilian population. He argues that tough economic sanctions can limit civilians’ 
access to basic needs, negatively affecting their economic well-being and disrupting the 
operation of basic health services. Given the negative costs and the possible humanitarian 
issues, it is important for us to truly understand exactly how and when sanctions work. 
This leads me to the current literature on the success of economic sanctions. 
Where the Literature Stands on the Success of Economic Sanctions 
As the use of economic sanctions has become a staple of foreign policy for much 
of the Developed World, the literature on the topic has grown. Much of the literature on 
economic sanctions is largely concentrated on the topic of whether economic sanctions 
actually work (Drury, 1999). As of today, the literature highly favors the conclusion that 
economic sanctions generally fail to persuade targeted states to give into the demands of 
sender states. But as I will show, there are those that believe economic sanctions are in 
fact an effective tool to world leaders.  
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Those who question the effectiveness of economic sanctions argue that sanctions 
rarely ever have their desired effect. Many point to Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott (1990), 
who argue that sanctions only work around 35 percent of the time. They come to this 
conclusion through extensive qualitative analyses. There results have arguably become 
the foundation of the sanctions literature. Pape (1997) takes this conclusion further; he 
argues we only ever see sanctions succeed because they are often followed by the threat 
or actual use of military force. In his mind this clouds the results of other researchers. He 
is critical of Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott (1990), arguing they are too generous in their 
analysis and case selection. He argues sanctions are only successful around 5 percent of 
the time. He explains that under his model only five of the forty cases that Hufbauer, 
Schott, and Elliott (1990) designate as successes can in fact be counted as wins for the 
senders. He further explains that eighteen of those cases actually ended by military force; 
in eight of the cases the sender nation(s) made no clear demands for concessions, six do 
not even qualify as cases of economic sanctions and three were indeterminate (Pape, p. 
66) This disagreement has led to a published back and forth debate between the 
researchers.  
Morgan and Schwebach (1997) look at the overall costs of economic sanctions, 
rather than simply looking at success rates; as previous scholars had done. They calculate 
the costs to both the sender and targeted nations. They also find that sanctions are 
generally ineffective as a foreign policy tool. They conclude that costs do matter. The 
authors find evidence for the basic assumption that sanctions are more effective when the 
costs are low to the sender and high for the target. Morgan and Schwebach (1997) 
conclude sanctions are often ineffective because the ability of the sender to reach this 
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equilibrium is so difficult. This is supported by Rowe (2001), who argues that one of the 
biggest problems with the use of economic sanctions is that scholars and policy makers 
are, in general, not really sure how to best implement sanctions in order to produce their 
desired effect. Nossal (1989) and Schwebach (2000) argue that states may use sanctions 
as a symbolic gesture, such as punishment or sending a clear message of disapproval to 
the international community. So the sender state may not be looking for any clear 
concessions; rather it just wants to cause harm to its adversaries. This could cause 
sanctions to seem more ineffective than they really are. 
Pensken (2011) argues that sanctions are largely ineffective because the negative 
costs are often pushed onto the civilian population, rather than the political elites that 
actually have a hand in governance. Penksen contends the use of “smart sanctions” can 
help alleviate this problem. Smart sanctions involve measures that are designed to 
directly affect the leadership of the targeted state rather than the civilian population. 
These measures can include the freezing of financial assets, imposition of arms 
embargos, reduction in foreign aid allotments, and the placement of travel bans on key 
government officials. Drezner (1998) also supports this theory when he concludes 
sanctions that do not successfully target political elites often are ineffective.  
This is further backed up by Major (2005), who argues sanctions need to be 
designed to cause the greatest effect to the section of the population that holds the most 
power over policy decisions. He contends that these sorts of policies do not guarantee 
civilians will be unaffected, but they reduce the probability of such issues arising.  He 
points out that humanitarian issues can actually cause sanctions to fail. In his analysis, he 
finds that in many cases a public that is hurt by the implementation of sanctions is more 
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likely to support the targeted regime and become disgruntled with the sender nation(s). 
This is problematic because it would suggest economic sanctions are having the opposite 
effect than intended. Rather than destabilizing a targeted regime, economic sanctions may 
in fact be strengthening them.   
Proponents, of course, argue that sanctions are a useful and successful foreign 
policy tool. Many argue that sanctions are a way to resolve international conflict or 
discord without either side resorting to violence. These scholars conclude sanctions are a 
tool that falls somewhere in the grey area between words and wars (Selden, 1999). 
Drezner (2003) argues that too many scholars hinge their opinion and analyses on the 
actual implication of sanctions. He contends that the threat of economic sanctions is often 
enough to persuade the threatened state(s) to cave to the demands of the potential 
sender(s). So he points out that the current literature on economic sanctions is not 
accurately measuring their effectiveness because many other scholars’ samples are 
biased.  
This theory is supported by other prominent IR scholars, such as Fearon (1997). 
Fearon (1997) argues state signaling is an important tool at the disposal of world leaders. 
He contends world leaders have to signal their attentions to other leaders in order to 
successfully accomplish their foreign policy objectives. He uses game theoretic models to 
show that if leaders signal their intent correctly, they can “tie the hands” of the leaders of 
targeted states. Basically, other world leaders will be forced to cave to the sender nation’s 
demands or face reprisal from their own citizenry. He concludes that the way in which 
leaders present themselves and their intentions has a major impact on the effectiveness of 
foreign policy endeavors, including economic sanctions. This is supported by Drezner 
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(1998). In his book the Sanctions Paradox, he presents a game theoretical model in which 
he shows that when it comes to economic sanctions leaders will gauge the willingness of 
the other side to escalate the confrontation. If the government of one state believes the 
other will escalate, it may be more willing to cave to the demands of its adversary. 
Though the success of the economic sanctions is an important area that needs to 
be studied, I would argue the literature is too concentrated on whether they work, and less 
concentrated on the specific factors that lead to their failure. This is, of course, not a 
completely new idea. As the literature on economic sanctions has grown, more and more 
scholars have begun to move their research in this direction. Allen (2008) states it well 
when she writes, “Because two different states with two different sets of decision-makers 
are involved in a given sanctions episode, scholars must recognize that the decision-
making processes behind successful sanctions and failures are different” (p. 135). The 
research in this area has been successful in shedding light on the reasons why we see 
some sanctions fail and others succeed.  
Ang and Pensken (2007) find that salience perceptions between the sender and 
target states help determine the outcome of the implementation of economic sanctions. 
They find that sanctions are generally more successful when the sender state finds the 
issues to be of very high importance. The logic behind this assumption is that the sender 
state will be more willing to escalate to more extreme measures if economic sanctions do 
not work. Also it can be assumed that in many cases the willingness of sender nation(s) to 
escalate will not escape the eyes of the targeted state. Ang and Pensken (2007) argue that 
when both nations see the issues as mutually important, sender states are in fact favored.  
McGillivray, F. Stam, and A. Stam (2004) argue the institutions of the sender 
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state(s) have an effect on the outcome and duration of imposed economic sanctions. They 
contend that if a nation transitions from a democratic government to a more authoritarian 
structure, already implemented economic sanctions are often dropped during the 
transition period. They also show that leadership changes seem to have an effect only on 
already implemented sanctions in authoritarian states. In democratic states new leaders 
tend not to discard already standing economic sanctions, whereas new authoritarian 
leaders generally drop already implemented economic sanctions. Escriba-Folch (2012) 
shows that different forms of governance within targeted states affect the way in which 
they react to the implementation of economic sanctions. 
McLean and Whang (2010) outline the effect of third party actors on the outcome 
of economic sanctions. They argue that targeted states will look to their trading partners 
or allies to determine the cost they will endure if sanctions are actually implemented 
against them. The general idea behind this conclusion is that if a targeted state’s primary 
trading partners and/or allies seem reluctant to support them, then the potential costs to 
the target should increase. This in turn will affect the way in which states respond to both 
the threat and implementation of economic sanctions. McLean and Whang (2010) find 
evidence that this is in fact the case.  
 Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott (1990) have identified several factors that affect the 
likelihood of the success of economic sanctions. They contend that these variables have 
an effect on the overall strength and effectiveness of economic sanctions because they 
help determine the costs the various actors will incur throughout their implementation. 
These variables include prior relationships between the states, economic condition of the 
targeted state, intensity of sanctions, and whether the nation has a strong ally (or black 
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knight) that will continue trade with it throughout the course of imposed economic 
sanctions. 
It is clear from the literature that the presence of black knights negatively affects 
the chances of sanction success (Drury, 1997; Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott, 1990).  The 
ally, or black knight, variable was originally created to account for Cold War 
international politics. This variable accounted for whether the targeted nation was 
receiving assistance from one of the superpowers when sanctions were implemented by 
its adversary. For example, if the U.S. continued to trade with a nation that the USSR was 
sanctioning, it would receive a score of one. The logic behind this variable goes along 
with a realist point of view, in which everyone is trying to get a leg up on one another 
within the international system. Though the Cold War is over, this variable is still 
relevant, and still in use. However, I would argue that much of the theoretical framework 
behind this variable is misrepresentative or limiting in terms of the causal mechanisms 
associated with these relationships.  
While I would contend that this sort of process may occur occasionally, and more 
so during the Cold War era, this is probably not the reason we see black knights in most 
cases. This is in line with much of the more recent sanctions literature, which sees black 
knights as trading with the sanctioned states simply because they want to profit from 
importing goods to the now less competitive markets of targeted states (Drury, 1999; 
Early, 2009). As Early (2009) argues, black knights often decide to trade with targeted 
states due to the possibility of financial gains for themselves. Furthermore, Early (2009) 
concludes that a sender nation’s allies are actually more likely to start or continue to trade 
with targeted states than the sender’s rivals. He contends that these nations see an 
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opportunity to increase trade revenues and jump at the opportunity. So basically, the 
black knight sees an opportunity to fill a hole in the targeted nations market, even though 
they risk upsetting the sender nation(s). But I would take this argument further and argue 
that this sort of mechanism can go both ways. I would contend that we should see third 
parties more willing to take the risk of upsetting sender nations in order to have access to 
a targeted state’s natural resources wealth.  
Given the information presented above, we can make several conclusions. First, 
the literature on economic sanctions is deeply divided on whether sanctions work. We 
can also conclude that it is important to look at both the threat and imposition stages of 
sanction cases. Furthermore, we see that there are costs to both the sender and target 
states, and possible humanitarian issues for the latter. So, it is important to understand 
what causes economic sanctions to fail. In recent years the literature on economic 
sanctions has begun to move away from the simple effective or not effective argument. 
Today more and more researchers have begun to explore what factors actually cause 
sanctions to fail. This is the path I wish to follow. In the following I will show how the 
literature on resource wealth can add to our understanding of economic sanctions. 
Resource Wealth 
The effect of natural resources on political phenomenon is a relatively new and 
expanding field. Natural resources have been shown to increase the ability of nation 
states. It is clear from the literature on the topic that resource wealth has a major effect on 
the political and economic development of a nation. The idea of there being a resource 
curse in much of the developing world has become a staple of the development literature. 
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The resource curse has been coined as an explanation for the inability of export-dominant 
economies or resource-rich nations to develop economically and politically. The theory 
argues that countries that are resource rich often fail to experience economic growth and 
tend to have ineffective and/or authoritarian governmental institutions.  
There are different ways this curse can take effect. One example is that natural 
resource wealth can lead to conflict between rival factions that want control of the 
wealth. This of course can lead to civil strife or conflict. Another example is that an 
economy can become completely reliant on a certain valuable resource. This allows other 
parts of the economy to become weak and neglected. The economy becomes dependent 
on a single resource, and once that resource runs out the economy comes crashing down 
(Stiglitz, 2006). Iimi (2007) lays out six ways this can occur: “Various reasons have been 
put forward for failures to effectively transform natural resources to growth: (1) the 
Dutch disease, (2) insufficient economic diversification, (3) rent seeking and conflicts, 
(4) corruption and undermined political institutions, (5) overconfidence and loose 
economic policies, and (6) debt overhang” (Iimi, p. 2). Ross (1999) states that three-
quarters of the nations in Sub-Saharan Africa, two-thirds of those in Latin America, the 
Caribbean, North Africa, and the Middle East are still export/commodity-based 
economies. These nations are still failing to develop and industrialize. This is, of course, 
a major problem, given that development and industrialization can lead to better 
standards of living for citizens of these nations.  
There are many explanations as to why this occurs. As mentioned above, one of 
the leading explanations put forward by scholars is that governments poorly manage their 
resources or fail to put forward policy that adequately develops other areas of their 
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economies. So essentially, poor governance is a leading cause of the lack of development 
and industrialization we see occurring in these nations. As Ross (1999) points out, 
governments in these nations often have a strong role in their economies. As such, these 
governments should theoretically have the power to mitigate the problems we see. They 
should have the ability to transfer resources to other areas of the economy to spur 
development. This has been the case in the few nations that have been able to avoid the 
resource curse. Botswana has long been seen as the success story of Africa. The nation is 
one of the few examples of a resource-rich nation that has been able to survive the 
resource curse. In 1980 rich diamond deposits were discovered by a South African 
company known as De Beers. The government quickly made arrangements with the 
foreign company to retain the rights to the mines. To this day they still have an equal 
partnership, with half of the total revenue being given to the government. The Botswana 
government then used the revenues from the diamond mines to help develop other areas 
of the economy and invest in education (Iimi, 2007). 
Researchers who study the resource curse have also found strong evidence that 
there is a link between natural resource wealth and authoritarianism. Jenson and 
Wantchekon (2004) conducted an analysis in which they present evidence of a direct 
negative correlation between resource wealth and democracy. They show that as resource 
wealth increases, the likelihood of democracy decreases. This is supported by Ross 
(2001). He finds that resource wealth hurts the formation of democratic regimes. Most 
notably he shows that oil wealth has impeded democracy in Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, 
Nigeria, and some oil-rich nations in Central America. He also provides evidence that 
non-oil resource wealth can also be detrimental to democratization. Wantchekon (2004) 
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concludes that the presence of natural resource wealth increases the level of inequality in 
nations. This is a very common theory throughout the literature on natural resource 
wealth. It is clear that in many of these governments, those that control the resource 
wealth also wield the most political power. This is all relevant to my argument because it 
shows that resource wealth has political ramifications and increases the ability of 
domestic political actors within a nation.  
The idea of natural resources increasing the ability of actors is actually an 
emerging area of research within the study of civil conflict. Buhaug, Gates, and Lujala 
(2009) show a positive correlation between natural resources and the duration of conflict. 
They argue that the availability of natural resources in rebel-controlled areas adds to the 
capability of rebel forces. This allows them to more effectively fight governmental forces 
and ultimately prolong hostilities. This is achieved through the revenues acquired from 
their resource wealth. They also find that governments are more likely to quickly crush 
rebel groups when the government is in control of a valuable natural resource. Collier, 
Hoefflert, and Soderbom (2008) argue that the presence of natural resource wealth also 
makes the reemergence of conflict more likely. This is further backed up by Collier and 
Hoefflert (1998). They show that the ability of rebel forces to capture and/or control 
natural resources can increase the likelihood of the emergence of hostilities. They 
conclude that this allows rebel groups to gain the ability and resources to effectively fight 
governmental forces. They also show that it can go the other way. If the government has 
control of the nation’s resource wealth, it generally possesses the capability to quickly 
squash any rebellion. Basically, the government has an increased ability to supersede the 
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cost of economic sanctions, allowing it to quickly dismantle any threat. I would argue 
that this is likely the case when it comes to economic sanctions as well.  
It is also clear from the literature that states that have resource wealth often are 
able to work around imposed economic sanctions. Emmanuel Kwesi Aning (2003) shows 
that nations in eastern Africa have been able to successfully maneuver around imposed 
sanctions to sell their valuable resources on the international market. He shows that 
Liberian natural resources continued to be traded as a way to fund military efforts after 
the implementation of economic sanctions by international actors. This is also seen in the 
case of international sanctions against Iran. As Early (2009) points out, China continues 
to trade with Iran despite extensive international sanctions. China is in fact the number 
one importer to Iranian oil. With China’s rapidly growing economy, oil has become a 
major concern for the nation. Askari, Forrer, Teegen, and Yang (2003) also show that for 
years, Iran has been able to work around sanctions implemented by the U.S. They argue 
that the Iranian government has actually been able to sell oil by moving it through other 
nations. He points out that Iran will often sell oil to the United Arab Emirates, which will 
in turn brand it as its own and sell it to other international actors, including the U.S.  
Oil is not the only resource allowing states to work around imposed economic 
sanctions. The Congolese have long been able to use their vast resource wealth to 
financially support the many conflicts that have plagued the nation. The Congo is 
considered to be one of the most resource-rich nations in the world with its vast deposits 
of diamonds, gold, and cobalt (Eichstaedt, 2010). Iimi (2007) shows that militant groups 
within the Congo have successfully persuaded nations such as Zimbabwe to provide 
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military support, including actual troops, for promises of rights to Congolese diamond 
mines.   
So we can make several conclusions based on the literature I have just presented. 
First, natural resource wealth clearly has a major effect on the inner workings of nations, 
both economically and politically. We see a high risk of authoritarian or simply 
repressive governments in nations that possess natural resource wealth. Resource wealth 
obviously increases the ability of actors to seize governmental control of these nations. 
Furthermore, we can see from the literature that resource wealth increases the ability of 
actors within civil conflicts. I will argue that these conclusions can be directly applied to 
the international and foreign policy arenas. 
The Case of Iran 
 During this section of my analysis, I wish to discuss a case in which we directly 
see natural resource wealth affecting the ability of a targeted state to survive the use of 
economic sanctions. As noted above there has been no direct research on the effects of 
resource wealth on economic sanctions, or rather its effects on foreign policy in general. 
My argument has been drawn largely from the conclusions of other areas of study. I 
would argue that showcasing an example of resource wealth increasing a target state’s 
ability to persevere sanction implementation will help support the conclusion on which I 
have based my analysis. This study will also allow me to show the complexity of this 
issue. For this short case study, I will look at the case of imposed economic sanctions 
against the Islamic Republic of Iran. 
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Iran is considered by many to be an example of the failure of economic sanctions 
to coerce other states. Iran has been under various forms of economic sanctions since the 
revolution that removed the Shah of Iran from power in 1979. The U.S. is often the 
primary sender in the Iranian case, accounting for the vast majority of the cases against 
Iran. The two countries have had a very strained relationship for the past four decades, 
and the U.S. has implemented sanctions against the Middle Eastern nation countless 
times during this timeframe (Askari et al., 2003). 
This was not always the case. Iran had once been one of America’s strongest 
allies. The Shah of Iran had been a close ally of the U.S., owing his rise to power to the 
CIA. The CIA had helped him depose the then democratic government as part of a power 
grab during the WWII era. The U.S., United Kingdom and the Soviet Union had been 
grappling for power throughout much of the conflict, in anticipation of a post-war change 
in the international power dynamic. The U.S. had also been intent on dismantling any 
remanence of the British Empire, which Iran had been part of (Herring, 2008). Iran had 
received particular attention from the U.S. due to its oil wealth and its strategic position 
as a supply route to the embattled Soviet Union. So to secure a position of influence 
within the Iranian government, the U.S. assisted in the overthrow of the democratic 
regime that was governing the nation at the time.    
This move did not win the U.S. any favor with the Iranian people. The Shah 
would prove to be a brutal dictator, using harsh repression to keep the nation under his 
control. This of course led to resentment towards the U.S. among the Iranian people. 
Many saw the U.S. as supporting the Shah’s brutal tactics, which they actually were. The 
CIA had been very active in training the Shah’s secret police force, which he used to 
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violently repress the Iran people. This resentment toward the U.S. was made evident very 
early in the revolution when a group of angry students stormed the U.S. embassy, taking 
its occupants hostage. U.S. public opinion shifted overnight as Americans woke up to 
pictures of American hostages plastered all over the news (Askari et. al, 2003). 
 The position of the U.S. toward the Middle Eastern nation has changed drastically 
since the hostage crises. In the preceding years, the U.S. had imposed economic sanctions 
against Iran countless times. Currently the U.S. government has multiple sanctions 
implemented against Iran. These sanctions are so severe that they have basically cut off 
all political, economic, and diplomatic ties between the two nations (O’Sullivan, 2010). 
O’Sullivan (2010) even goes as far as to call them the most stringent portfolio of 
economic sanctions in the current world system.   
 For the past 30-plus years, the U.S. has had various sanctions implemented 
against the nation, claiming that the government is directly supporting several terrorist 
organizations, such as Hamas, Hezbollah, and Palestine Islamic Jihad (Eckert, 2010). Iran 
has been on the U.S.’s list of State Sponsors of Terrorism since January 19, 1984. Iran is 
one of four nations on this list (U.S. State Department). The U.S. classifies State 
Sponsors of terrorism as “countries determined by the Secretary of State to have 
repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism are designated pursuant to 
three laws: section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act, section 40 of the Arms Export 
Control Act, and section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act” (U.S. State Department). 
The U.S. is not alone in accusing the Iranian government of supporting international 
terrorist organizations. Many of the U.S.’s European allies have followed suit, 
implementing sanctions against Iran for sponsoring terrorist organizations. Many of 
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which did so after the Lockerbie bombing, in which terrorists set off a bomb on a 
commercial airliner over Ireland. Iran and Libya were accused of supporting the terrorists 
that carried out the act (Eckert, 2010). 
However, the most salient case, in terms of the international community, of 
economic sanctions levied against Iran are those put in place to halt the nation’s nuclear 
ambitions. Under international law, only the permanent members of the U.N. Security 
Council are allowed to possess nuclear weapons. This has become an established norm 
and largely accepted standard. Iran has signed both the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty 
and the 1974 Safe Guards agreement. The 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty forbids nations 
other than permanent members of the U.N. Security Council from acquiring nuclear 
weapons. The 1974 Safe Guards agreement requires signees to report the processing 
and/or use of nuclear materials (Gold, 2009). However, it should be noted that both of 
these agreements were signed by the Shah of Iran’s government, a fact that the current 
Iranian regime believes makes them illegitimate.  
Not surprisingly, the international community has largely come out against the 
emergence of a nuclear Iran. Many believe that the presence of a nuclear Iran could cause 
unforeseen damage to the stability of the region. Many fear an increased threat to Israel, 
which Iran does not recognize as a sovereign state.  Furthermore, many fear that Iran’s 
continued defiance to both the U.N. Security Council and the International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA) could undermine the effectiveness of nonproliferation 
agreements. Iran’s continued defiance could cause a perception that the U.N. Security 
Council is either unwilling or unable to enforce nonproliferation agreements (Chubin, 
2006). This could, in turn, cause other states to actively pursue nuclear technology. The 
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U.S., France, Germany, the United Kingdom (E-3) and the IAEA have worked together 
over the years to try to pressure the Iranian regime to stop its effort to acquire nuclear 
technology, their principal claim being that the presence of a nuclear Iran threatens the 
stability of the region and is a matter of national security. As Gold (2009) explains, the 
involvement of the IAEA is important since it diminishes the claims put forward by 
others that these efforts are just an extension of the strained relationship between the U.S. 
and Iran. The involvement of the IAEA brings neutrality to the international effort to stop 
Iran’s current nuclear ambitions.  
The Iranian government, however, argues that their intentions are entirely 
peaceful (Chubin, 2006). Iran’s leaders argue that it is their sovereign right to acquire and 
use nuclear technology (Gold, 2009). The Iranian government claims it is seeking nuclear 
technology in order to generate electricity, diversify its economy, and possibly become a 
regional supplier of peaceful nuclear technology in the future. The nation is largely an 
oil-exporting economy, and claims that the development of nuclear technology will help 
it become a more scientific and modernized state (Chunbin, 2006).   
This is, of course, disputed by many in the international community. The U.S. 
claims that Iran is trying to become a regional hegemon. They point to the fact that the 
Iranian government has been trying to purchase various forms of advanced military 
technology from nations such as China, Russia, and North Korea. The U.S. claims the 
pursuit of such technology is proof of the underlying malicious intent of the Iranian 
government. These military technologies include Scud and Rodong ballistic missiles, 
Silkworm cruise missiles, and Kilo-class submarines (Amuzegar, 1997). 
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The U.S. also points to Iran’s continued claim of sovereignty over the Island of 
Abu Musa, which is located along oil routes in the Persian Gulf, as a sign of Iran’s 
continued desire to be a regional hegemon (Eckert, 2010). This is a long-standing dispute 
between Iran and the United Arab Emirates. Iran has been strong-worded in its claim of 
sovereignty over the island. As many would point out, a nuclear Iran would be in a much 
better position to defend the island.  
 Much of the international community agrees with America’s claims and as a 
result have implemented sanctions against Iran. This includes sanctions directly imposed 
by the U.N. Security Council, after years of negotiations to get Iran to comply with the 
efforts of the IAEA. In all, the Security Council has passed three resolutions against the 
Iranian government. Though as O’Sullivan (2010) states, China has been a roadblock in 
the Security Council’s ability to implement and enforce economic sanctions against Iran.  
 There have been mixed claims when it comes to how successful economic 
sanctions have been in damaging the Iranian economy. Amuzegar (1997) argues that 
much of the talk about economic sanctions destabilizing the Iranian economy can be 
simply boiled down to rhetoric from politicians and policy makers. He contends that 
sanctions have been relatively ineffective.  
Askari et al. (2003), argue that Iran’s economic hardships can be explained by 
other factors that have nothing to do with the economic sanctions that have been levied 
against the nation. Iran’s per capita GNP has steadily decreased throughout the 
implementation of economic sanctions. But as the authors point out, this can be explained 
by rapid population increases, which Iran has experienced throughout the implementation 
of economic sanctions. The nation’s population increased by about 3 percent every year 
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from 1979 through 1998. During this time frame, the nation also saw a steady decrease, 
about 2 percent, of export revenue. The oil revenues also decreased during this time 
frame, decreasing around 4 percent annually. But during much of this time frame the 
majority of oil-producing nations also experienced a drop in oil revenues. Furthermore, 
Iran’s internal oil needs grew drastically during this time frame. With a fast-growing 
population the need for Iran to use its oil wealth internally increased. Also during the 
course of the economic sanctions, Iran remained a largely centralized economy, with 
much of the nation’s industries being controlled by the government. This would naturally 
affect the growth of the nation’s economy. 
 Askari et al. (2003) point out that Iran was forced to fight a devastating war with 
Iraq during the beginning years of economic sanction implementation. Wars are 
expensive, and the Iranian government was confronted with a well-equipped adversary 
who was receiving intelligence support from the U.S. Saddam attacked shortly after the 
Iranian revolution, when the Iranian hostage crises was still going on. So, naturally the 
U.S. was not overly eager to come to Iran’s aid. The U.S. claimed neutrality but did not 
discourage Iraqi aggression. The U.S. also looked the other way as Iraq used chemical 
and biological weapons against the Iranians. This left the Iranian people more upset with 
the Americans and the nation’s infrastructure and economy damaged.  
As Amuzegar (1997) points out, there is evidence that the Iranian economy is 
doing fairly well. He states that the Iranian government has begun to build up the nation’s 
infrastructure. Eckert (2010) states that the government has begun to rebuild much of 
infrastructure destroyed or damaged during the hostilities of the Iran-Iraq conflict. He 
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also explains that the Iranians have begun to build and use multiple new sea and air ports. 
This suggests that the nation is trading regularly.  
 Amuzegar (1997) contends that visitors to the nation have reported much of the 
country's infrastructure, oil facilities, farmland, manufacturing plants, and electric power 
plants were being repaired. Also, the Iranians seemed to be expanding their oil and 
natural gas pipelines and networks. Urban area telecommunication networks were being 
expanded. It is now much more common for Iranians to have access to advance 
telecommunication, such as faxes and mobile phones. Amuzegar (1997) points out that 
the Iranian government had been actively building new dams and modern irrigation 
systems for the nation’s agricultural sector. The government was also clearly spending a 
lot of money improving its roads, water, gas, electricity, and telephone systems. The 
nation also had an expanding metallurgical industry. They are today very active in 
exporting steel, copper, and aluminum. Eckert (2010) sums things up by pointing out that 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank (WB), the United Nations 
Development Program (UNDP), and the European press all indicated that the effects of 
sanctions were only having a marginal effect on the Iranian economy.  
 It is also very clear that the Iranian government is still able to trade oil and 
industrial goods to its close allies, most notably, China. For many years, China has acted 
as a black knight in the Iranian case. China is a rapidly growing economy and has 
experienced immense industrialization as the government’s economic reforms have 
pushed the nation into an industrial revolution (Eckert, 2010). China’s industrialization 
has been accompanied by a dramatic rise in the nation’s population, which has created a 
high demand for oil. This has all led the rising power to align itself with Iran. 
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For Iran, China is an irreplaceable ally. China is one of the five permanent 
members of the U.N. Security Council, which is responsible for preventing nuclear 
proliferation. In recent years, the U.N. Security Council has pressured Iran to cooperate 
with the IAEA. Iran has remained uncooperative, so the U.N. has been forced to 
implement economic sanctions against the nation on three separate occasions (Eckert, 
2010). But as Eckert points out, finding consensus between the Security Council 
members has proven difficult given the dependency of China on Iranian oil and Russia’s 
history of support for the Iranian government. She points out that there has been a severe 
lack of follow-up on compliance in the Iranian case compared to other sanction cases. In 
fact, no special committee has even been set up to monitor compliance, which is 
commonplace in almost every other case. Eckert (2010) explains it well when she states 
that “It appears that the enormous effort to achieve consensus to impose sanctions in the 
first place has left little enthusiasm for aggressive enforcement, and lack of political will 
has resulted in half-hearted measures” (p. 73). 
This is reiterated by Ong-Webb (2009), who points out that both Iran and China 
have the other in its pocket. He states that the Chinese are desperate for oil, and that 
currently Iranian oil makes up 12 percent of their annual imports. Furthermore, the 
Iranians are desperate for Chinese manufactured goods, since no one else will trade with 
them. Chinese dependence is further shown by the fact that China has generally 
supported actions against nuclear proliferation in the past, but simply not in the case of 
Iran. 
Taking this all into account, we can come to a couple key conclusions. First and 
foremost, the sanctions levied against Iran have failed to show any returns for the west; 
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Iran is still defiant in sticking to its ways. Despite being under economic sanctions for the 
majority of the time since the Iranian revolution, the Iranian economy has not suffered 
that severely from the implementation of economic sanctions. Many of Iran’s economic 
issues during this time frame can be explained by other factors. Secondly, I would argue 
that the sanctions levied against Iran have been severe. The U.S. and its European Allies 
have heavily restricted trade to the Middle Eastern nation. We also see that there is a 
black knight in this situation. As China has continued its rise as an economic world 
power, it has become very dependent on Iranian oil to support its growth. This 
relationship has led to China continuing to trade with Iran, despite immense international 
pressure not to.  
This is important to my analysis because this case shows exactly how resource 
wealth can increase the ability of a state to survive. Despite the growth of its industrial 
sector, the Iranian economy is heavily dependent on oil (Askari et al., 2003). This is 
clearly the main pillar of the Iranian economy. If the nation was unable to sell oil, it can 
be assumed that conditions would be much different. Furthermore, China has shown 
considerable support for nonproliferation actions by the international community. We can 
assume if Iran did not have oil wealth, China would take a much different stance on the 
Iranian situation. Though we will probably never know if things would have turned out 
differently if Iran did not have oil wealth, we can see that its resource wealth has 
increased the ability of the nation to remain defiant as long as it has.  
 
 
27 
 
Theoretical Argument 
This sampling of the literature tells us several things that we can use when coming 
up with a theory about how natural resources affect economic sanctions. First, the 
literature is starkly divided on the topic of whether sanctions are an effective tool. As 
such, researchers have begun to explore the facts that determine sanctions success. Above 
I explained how natural resources have been shown to have a major effect on a nation’s 
internal governmental structure, as well as a nation’s ability to industrialize and progress 
into a “developed” economy. There is strong evidence that natural resource wealth 
encourages authoritarian governments to form, often allowing those that control the 
valuable resource to maintain control of the nation. We also see that natural resources 
have been shown to increase the ability of the actors in civil conflict. Taking that into 
account, we can logically assume that natural resource wealth should also give targeted 
states a distinct advantage in cases of economic sanctions.  
It has been shown in the literature that having a strong trading partner that does 
not give into international pressure helps a targeted nation persevere sanction 
implementation. This has even become a standard control variable within much of the 
research (Haufbauer, Schott, and Elliott, 1990; Drury, 1998; Drezner, 1998). I would 
argue that the presence of natural resource wealth will increase the willingness of other 
nations to continue to trade with a targeted state, despite the chance of retribution from 
other international actors. For example, if the U.S. decides to sanction an oil-rich state, it 
is possible that another economic power, such as China, will be willing to continue to 
trade with the targeted nation. This can be assumed through a simple cost gain analysis. 
In the eyes of said nation, the gains from continuing to trade with a sanctioned state may 
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outweigh the possible negative cost from upsetting the sender nation(s). So natural 
resource wealth will ultimately increase the ability of targeted states to survive the 
implementation of sanctions. This theory could help explain why oil-rich states like Iran 
and Iraq are able to survive economic sanctions for long periods of time. Based on the 
literature I have presented here, we should see a higher rate of failure of economic 
sanctions in cases where the targeted nation has resource wealth. This leads me to my 
hypothesis, which is presented below. 
Hypothesis 1: Given natural resource wealth, targeted regimes will be more 
equipped to bear the burden of economic sanctions and therefore will be more 
likely to resist the will of the sender nation(s).   
As I have indicated in my examination of the current literature, the threat stage of 
economic sanctions matters. It is very logical to assume that natural resource wealth will 
directly affect the actions of both sender and target nations within the threat stage. I 
would argue that target states will perceive themselves as having an increased ability 
when it comes to economic sanctions. We can logically assume that if a nation has a 
valuable resource it will believe that it will still be able to sell its valuable resource to 
nations other than the sender nation. Given this perceived advantage, targeted states will 
be less likely to give into the demands of sender states. Senders should also be unlikely to 
drop their threat, due to the logical assumption that they have already weighed the costs 
of implementing economic sanctions. This leads me to my second hypothesis, which is 
shown below. 
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Hypothesis 2: Given natural resource wealth within the target state, cases in 
which economic sanctions are threatened will be more likely to progress to the 
actual implementation.   
We can also assume that if a case does not actually progress to the 
implementation stage, a target state most likely does not see itself as having an increased 
ability to persevere the implementation of economic sanctions. This could be caused by 
multiple factors. There may be a lack of nations other than the sender that it can trade 
with, trade with the sender nation may be worth more than concessions, or the target may 
see its allies as being supportive of the sender attention. Most notably would be the 
position of key allies. As McLean and Whang (2010) have shown, this is a factor that 
affects the actions of targeted states. Taking this into account, we can logically assume 
that if a case of the threat of economic sanctions is resolved in the threat stage, the sender 
will have gained more from the compromise than the intended target. This leads me to 
my third hypothesis, which is shown below.  
Hypothesis 3: Given natural resource wealth in the target state, in cases in which 
sanctions do not progress to the imposition stage, targeted states will concede 
more in a compromise than sender nations.   
 In the following sections I will test this hypothesis both empirically and 
qualitatively.  
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Empirical Model 
As I have mentioned above, I wish to explore the effects of natural resources on 
the success of economic sanctions. The general idea is that nations will be able to 
supersede the negative cost of sanctions if they have resource wealth. In the following, I 
will use an Ordinary Least Squares model (OLS) to operationalize my first and third 
hypotheses. I have chosen to do this because the dependent variable for these two 
analyses will be a ten point ordinal measure. For my second model I will run a probit 
analysis. I have chosen to do this because this analysis will use a dichotomous variable 
for its dependent variable. 
My first model will look at the ability of states with resource wealth to survive the 
implementation of economic sanctions. The final two models will look at the ways in 
which states act during the threat stage. Once again the general idea is that states with 
resource wealth will act differently because they realize that they have an advantage in 
terms of sanction survival.  
As my sample I will use cases in which G8 member states and/or the European 
Union are considered to be the primary sender form 1980 until 2005. The term “primary 
sender” simply represents the state that first initiates and/or takes the lead in a push for 
the use of economic sanctions. I have decided to use cases in which G8 member states 
and the European Union are primary senders for several reasons. First, these nations 
make up the vast majority of sanction activity and therefore provide me with an ample 
sample size. This will allow me to more adequately explain the variation in the effects of 
economic sanctions. Secondly, scholarly research has shown that sanctions put forward 
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by the hegemonic power, economically powerful states and powerful international 
organizations have the largest effect (Drury, 2001).  
As the last true superpower, the U.S. is clearly the hegemonic power in the 
current international community and has a very powerful economic reach throughout the 
world.  The rest of the G8 nations are also very powerful economic powers as well. So 
we should see them wield this form of coercion more than weaker states, and do so more 
effectively. The European Union (EU) is arguably one of the most powerful International 
Governmental Organizations (IGOs) in the world. Europe contains some of the most 
powerful economies in the international community. As integration has occurred among 
the nations of Europe, the EU has become a powerful economic actor within the 
international community. So, together the U.S., G8 member states, and the EU should 
theoretically implement the most powerful and effective economic sanctions. 
For the purposes of this study, I will eliminate all cases in which the European 
Union is the target. I have chosen to do this simply for the fact that there is no set 
measure of natural resource wealth for the entirety of the union. Furthermore, given the 
complexity of the European Union and the previous European Economic Community, it 
would be difficult to calculate this measure myself while ensuring the integrity of my 
model.  
I will use the data from the University of North Carolina TIES database to 
account for cases of sanction threat and implementation during the time period given 
above. This is a prominent data source on economic sanctions and covers the time period 
I have chosen. This dataset is currently coded to include all cases of economic sanctions 
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implemented in or before 2005. There is continued data on many of these cases that were 
not concluded before the end of 2005.  
I have excluded several types of sanctions from my model. As I have already 
mentioned, sanctions have become a major staple of foreign diplomacy for the economic 
powers of the world. The large economies often implement minor sanctions against each 
other for various perceived trade violations and other minor issues. The U.S. in particular 
is very fond of this method of coercion. For example the U.S. has implemented minor 
sanctions against Canada many times over the years as a way to send a message of 
disapproval for minor trade disputes. These sorts of sanctions more or less act as a simple 
signal of disapproval toward other large economies. In most cases the infraction is minor 
and does not really lead to any further confrontation. For this reason I have excluded 
these cases from my sample. This is the norm for research within the study of economic 
sanctions (Drury, 2001). As such, I have excluded cases which the TIES dataset classifies 
as being implemented for the improvement of environmental policies, trade practices, 
implementation of economic reform, and other.  
 I have also removed cases in which direct economic pressure was not used against 
the target state. These include cases such as asset freezes (of regime officials), travel bans 
(of regime officials), and withdrawals from previous trade agreements. These cases 
simply do not fit into my model, in the sense that they do not relate to the ability of a 
nation to withstand economic sanctions. Including these cases would simply bias my 
results, and negatively affect the accuracy of my analysis.  
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 Given the format of my data, I have been forced to cut multiple observations from 
my analysis. This is due to the fact that in order to combine the World Bank and TIES 
dataset you can only have one observation for every country, during each year. As 
anyone who studies sanctions knows, it is very common for a sender state to make 
multiple threats at a given time. Furthermore, the TIES dataset codes changes to a given 
set of sanctions as a brand new case. This method of coding can leave one with multiple 
cases for one disagreement. In order to facilitate the merging of the TIES and World 
Bank datasets, I went through the data and kept the most severe case for each country in 
each year. In order not to bias my sample, I created a variable that accounts for how 
many cases were levied against each state each year. For example, if there were six cases 
put forward against Iran in 1996, the case variable would receive a value of six. By doing 
this I avoid biasing my sample and avoid any possibility of error from self-coding. 
For all three of my models I will use resource wealth as my independent variable. 
For my measure of resource wealth, I will use a measure of income from natural resource 
rents. I will use the World Bank Development indicators dataset to calculate this variable. 
I will calculate this measure by multiplying a nation’s total GDP for the given year by the 
percent of GDP from natural resource wealth. I will then log this measure, as is common 
practice within the literature. I have decided to use this measure for multiple reasons. 
This measure will give me one uniform measure of resource wealth, which should help 
limit any bias in my sample that could arise from accounting for many forms of resource 
wealth separately. Secondly, for the purposes of this model, I wish to look at all natural 
resource wealth, not just simply the resources typically associated with the resource 
curse, such as oil and natural gas. But rather, I would like to account for all resource 
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wealth; this will include everything from oil reserves to cocoa crops. I will use the 
percent of GDP from natural resources for a given nation the year before the threat of 
sanctions. I will take this measure and use it to calculate the numeric value of a nation’s 
GDP from the year before economic sanctions were implemented. I will use this numeric 
measure as my indicator of resource wealth.  
First Analysis 
My first analysis will test my first hypothesis, which argues that states with 
resource wealth will have an increased ability to survive the imposition of economic 
sanctions. For this model my dependent variable will represent the ability of a regime to 
withstand economic coercion. Much of the literature on economic sanctions uses a 
dichotomous variable that accounts for the success of economic sanctions in a given case. 
This measure is generally calculated by researchers looking at a case and deciding 
whether the use of economic sanctions was successful in persuading the targeted states to 
give into the demands of the sender nation(s). I would argue that the use of this sort of 
measure is problematic. The fact of the matter is that negotiations between states are 
complex; they are not by any means simple. I would argue that using a simple pass/fail 
sort of measure causes a study to miss out on the variation one sees in negotiations. For 
example it is perfectly possible to have two nations both cave to the demands of a sender, 
but have one state give up less than the other. By using a simple dichotomous variable 
one misses out on this variation. I would argue that this variation is important to measure, 
especially when looking at a state’s ability to survive the implementation of economic 
sanctions. Just because a sender state is seen as “winning” does not mean that the target 
state did not come out better through negotiations. Taking my argument into account, we 
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can assume that a state with resource wealth will have a better position at the negotiating 
table. I would argue that it is very important to use a measure that accounts for the 
variation in settlements.  
Taking this all into account, I have chosen to use the TIES dataset’s target 
settlement variable as a proxy for state ability. This variable measures the settlement 
outcome in terms of the goals of the target on a ten point scale. “The scale ranges from 0 
to 10, with 10 representing the best possible outcome for the settlement. As best as 
possible, coders should assign a number between 0 and 10 to approximate the nature of 
the settlement. For example, in a case where the U.S. threatens China with trade 
sanctions, the coder may believe that the U.S. and China had a roughly equally favorable 
outcome, but slightly favoring the U.S.” (TIES Codebook). This will allow me to 
accurately access the capability of a nation to withstand coercion through economic 
sanctions. Targeted states that concede to all or most of their goals can be assumed to 
have little perceived ability to survive the implementation of economic sanctions, while 
targeted states with an increased ability should fall on the higher end of this scale.  
I will also use multiple control variables in my model, the first of which will be an 
allies variable. This variable will account for the number of G8 members that acted as 
secondary senders in each case of economic sanctions. It is logical to assume that the 
severity of a case will increase as more powerful economies participate. It can also be 
assumed that other nations will be less likely to act as black knights and continue to trade 
with the sanctioned state out of fear of greater reprisal. I have simply calculated this value 
by counting the number of G8 nations listed as secondary senders within the TIES 
dataset. Furthermore, the participation of more large economies may weaken the 
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negotiating position of the targeted nation, which would directly affect my dependent 
variable.   
My second control variable will be a dummy variable for cases that occurred 
during the Cold War. When doing a study of this sort it is important to look at sanctions 
implemented during and after the Cold War differently (Drury, 1998). During the Cold 
War the U.S. and its European allies implemented sanctions largely to dissuade the 
spread of communism. Since the breakup of the Soviet Union the foreign policy goals of 
both the U.S. and the European community have changed. The black knight concept 
originated from the Cold War era. During this time frame the East and the West were in 
constant competition for influence all around the globe. So if one of the two superpowers 
sanctioned a nation, it was very likely that the other would begin to economically support 
the nation in an attempt to undermine its adversary’s position. Considering this, I would 
argue that it is important to take this dynamic into account. Given that it is commonly 
thought that the Cold War officially ended in 1993, I have coded all cases that took place 
before 1993 as a one and all case afterwards as a zero.  
I will also use a variable to account for the severity of the economic sanctions 
implemented. This is an important component to any analysis of economic sanctions. 
Economic sanctions are very complex and often designed specifically to attempt to cause 
as much harm as possible to the target. Also, each set of sanctions will be tailored for a 
specific effect, which may be severe or mild. Due to this vast variation between cases, it 
is essential to account for the severity of a series of economic sanctions. There have been 
multiple factors and variables put forward by the literature. These include such measures 
as prior relationship between the target and sender, state of the target’s economy, state of 
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the target’s political system and intensity of international pressure. In much of the 
literature, these various control variables are accounted for individually. But for my 
analysis I have chosen to use a single variable to account for the severity of sanctions for 
several important reasons. First and foremost, it is difficult to find a trustworthy dataset 
that accounts for all of these factors. I would argue that pulling measures from various 
sources can possible damage the accuracy of one’s model. Many of these variables are 
coded by individual researchers, so using multiple sources brings about the possibility of 
data inconsistency. Also I would argue that having a long list of control variables can 
cloud a model. There is a fine line between accounting for every possible alternative 
factor and preserving the integrity and simplicity of a model.  
As such I have decided to use the TIES dataset’s cost to the target nation variable. 
This is a measure that accounts for the overall cost of a case on economic sanctions on a 
targeted state. This variable takes into account the many variables that account for the 
severity of economic sanctions. This variable is coded as an ordinal measure. A value of 
one represents minor economic hardship, while a value of three represents severe 
economic hardships. The criteria in which this variable was coded follows. 
(1)“Minor : An episode should be coded as minor if no evidence exists that the 
health of the target’s economy was impacted by the actions of the sender. 
(2) Major : An episode should be coded as major if evidence exists that the 
sender’s sanctions resulted in significant macroeconomic difficulties on the health 
of the target economy. Evidence of major effects may include abnormal changes 
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(increases of over 5%) in the inflation or unemployment rate of the target 
economy or drastic reductions in trade relationships. 
(3) Severe : An episode should be coded as severe if evidence exists that the 
sender’s sanctions halted the ability of the target’s economy to function. Evidence 
of a severe threats include reports that a country may lose the ability to obtain 
critical supplies (such as food, water, electricity, oil), increases the mortality rate, 
or completely loses the ability to trade with foreign governments.” (TIES 
Codebook) 
I will use the length of the sanctions as another control variable. It is important to 
account for the length in which sanctions were implemented for two main reasons. First 
is that nations are often able to hide or compensate for the negative effects of sanctions in 
the early stages of their implementation. But as time passes it becomes harder for them to 
do so. Secondly, as sanctions continue, more and more damage is theoretically done to a 
targeted nation (Nossal, 1989). So it is only logical to assume that each nation will have a 
breaking point, so to speak. At this point the nation will give into outside pressure. As 
time goes on it is more probable that this point will be reached. I will account for the 
length of sanctions by giving a simple numeric value to each case. For example, a nation 
that endured the use of sanctions for ten years will receive a value of ten. I will use 
standard rounding rules to simplify my values for this variable. I will measure from the 
time that sanctions were first threatened by the sender state and stop at the point in time 
that either the sanctions were removed or policy changes were made by the targeted 
nation. This is the norm when it comes to measuring sanction length. I will also start and 
stop at the parameters of my time frame. 
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For my final control variable I will use a dummy variable for the presence of an 
International Organization (IO) within the sanctioning process. It has been shown by the 
literature that the presence of an IO can help increase the likelihood of success in cases of 
economic sanctions (Drury, 1997). I will use the IO variable provided in the TIES 
dataset. This is a simple dichotomous variable. A value of one indicates that an IO was 
directly involved in the sanctioning process, while a value of zero represents no direct 
involvement by an IO. 
Second Analysis 
My second analysis will test my second hypothesis, which argues that cases in 
which the target state has resource wealth will be more likely to progress from the threat 
stage to the actual implementation of economic sanctions. For this model I will only 
include cases in which a clear threat was given by the sender state. If a clear threat was 
not given by the sender to the target state, the target state would not have had a chance to 
negotiate with the sender state before economic sanctions were actually implemented. So 
therefore, these cases do not fit with my model. I will account for this by using the threat 
variable included within the TIES dataset. This is a simple dichotomous variable that 
accounts for whether a clear threat was given by the sender nation(s). I have simply 
dropped all cases in which a clear threat was not given.  
I will also use a simple dichotomous variable to account for whether economic 
sanctions were actually implemented against the target state. A value of zero will indicate 
that sanctions were not implemented, while a value of one will indicate that sanctions 
were implemented. For this model, I will once again use my natural resource wealth 
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variable as my independent variable. I will also include my Cold War, Allies, IO and 
number of cases control variables used in my first model.  
I will use two other measures in this model in order to account for the perceived 
severity and costs associated with each case of a threat of economic sanctions. Given the 
fact that in many of these cases sanctions were not actually implemented, I cannot use the 
cost of economic sanctions variable used to account for severity in my first model. The 
first control variable I will use is a measure of the commitment of the sender state. This 
accounts for the overall salience of the issue to the sender nation. It can be logically 
assumed that the commitment of the sender will directly affect its willingness to move 
from the threat stage to the implementation stage of economic sanctions. For this reason 
it is important to account for sender commitment within my model. I will use a variable 
provided in the TIES dataset to account for sender commitment. This is an ordinal 
measure. A value of one represents weak commitment by the sender, while a value of 
three represents strong commitment by the sender nation. The TIES dataset codes this 
variable as follows. 
(1) “Weak: A statement qualifies as weak if the sender’s threat indicates that if the 
target state fails to alter a certain behavior, the sender will consider numerous 
possible options, including sanctions. An example of a very weak commitment is 
as follows, French trade policy is unacceptable. Germany will consider several 
various political and economic courses of actions to address this problem. 
 
(2) Moderate: A statement qualifies as moderate if the sender’s threat indicates that if 
the target state fails to alter a certain behavior, the sender will consider sanctions 
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as a possibility. For a commitment to be considered moderate, some form of 
sanctions must be specially mentioned as a possible response. An example of a 
moderate commitment is as follows, French trade policy is unacceptable. 
Germany will consider increasing tariffs to address this problem 
 
(3)  Strong: A statement qualifies as strong if an “if …then” statement can be 
identified. An “if…then” statement means that the sender is explicit that if a 
certain behavior is not altered, then a form of economic sanctions will be 
imposed. An example of a strong commitment is as follows, French trade policy 
is unacceptable. If such policies continue, Germany will increase tariffs to address 
this problem.” (TIES Codebook) 
 
The second new measure I will use is the anticipated cost to the sender. We can 
logically assume that as the perceived costs of economic sanctions increase, so will the 
likelihood that sender states will concede during the threat stage. Taking this into 
account, it is important to account for the perceived costs of sanction implementation. 
This measure will be a one to three ordinal variable. The TIES coding description is listed 
below. 
(1) “Minor: An episode should be coded as minor if no evidence exists that the health 
of the target’s economy will be impacted by the actions of the sender. 
 
(2) Major: An episode should be coded as major if evidence exists that the sender’s 
sanctions will impose significant macroeconomic difficulties on the health of the 
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target economy. Evidence of major effects may include abnormal changes 
(increases of over 5%) in the inflation or unemployment rate of the target 
economy or drastic reductions in trade relationships. 
 
(3) Severe: An episode should be coded as severe if evidence exists that the sender’s 
sanctions have the potential to halt the ability of the target’s economy to function. 
Evidence of a severe threat include reports that a country may lose the ability to 
obtain critical supplies (such as food, water, electricity, oil), increases the 
mortality rate, or completely loses the ability to trade with foreign governments.” 
(TIES Codebook) 
 
Third Analysis 
My third analysis will test my final hypothesis, which argues that states with 
resource wealth will be more likely to concede more in negotiations if the threat of the 
use of economic sanctions never progresses to the imposition stage. I will once again 
only use cases in which a clear threat was given by the sender nation(s). For my 
dependent variable I will once again use the target settlement variable used in my first 
model. My dependent variable will be my measure of natural resource wealth. I will also 
use my anticipated costs to target, sender commitment, Allies, number of cases, and Cold 
War control variables used in the previous analyses. I have excluded my IO measure 
from this model due to missing data issues. 
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Before I move on to actual analysis, I feel it is important to address an issue that 
some may have with my model. One of the common control variables often used in the 
economic sanction literature is a targeted nations GDP. Generally speaking, as the wealth 
of nation increases so does its ability to survive the implementation of economic 
sanctions. Due to the fact that I am using a measure of GDP as my independent variable, 
some may argue that I need to account for overall GDP in my model. I have decided not 
to do this for multiple reasons. First and foremost my analysis concentrates largely on 
resource-dependent economies. In many of the resource-dependent economies in my 
study, GDP from natural resource rents directly account for a nation’s wealth. If I were to 
account for GDP by itself I would be measuring wealth twice in many cases. This, I 
would argue, would damage my model, in the sense that I would not be accurately 
measuring the effect of resource wealth. Finally, the overall wealth and strength of an 
economy is accounted for in my standard severity measure. The literature has clearly 
shown that the costs of economic sanctions are generally less for wealthier nations. So 
the overall cost of economic sanctions will be lower for these states, while they will be 
higher for poorer nations. Economic factors are directly accounted for within the cost of 
economic sanctions variable that I am using as my severity measure. So GDP is 
accounted for in my analysis, I have simply chosen to account for it in a way that does 
not negatively affect the accuracy of my study. 
Empirical Results and Discussion 
 In this part of my analyses, I will run the empirical models I described in the last 
section. I will work through all three of my models in subsequent order, describing the 
results for each individual model. Then I will broadly discuss the results and what they 
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tells us about the effects of resource wealth on the implementation of economic sanctions. 
Furthermore, I will explain why we may be seeing these results.  
Table.1 Empirical Test Hypothesis 1 
Target 
Settlement 
Outcome 
 
Coef. 
 
Std. Err. 
 
t 
 
p value 
 
95% confidence 
Natural 
Resource 
Rents 
(GDP) 
.3038852 .1710235 0.89 0.043** .0464405, .654211 
Allies .4779546 .4331865 0.55 0.139 -.4093878, 
1.365297 
Cold War 2.21484 .7290052 1.52 0.002*** .7215407, 3.70814 
IO .7991316 1.09  0.54 0.142 -6984965, 2.29676 
Length -.1622434 .0857845 -0.94 0.0345**  -.337965, 
.0134781 
Target 
Costs 
-.7076591 3.623585 -0.56 0.1365 -2.003142, 
.5878236 
Cases -3.581542 1.249694 -0.14 0.004*** -6.141425, -
1.02166 
cons .4390489 .6767605 0.65   0.519 -.9142174, 
1.792315 
p < .1 * p < .05 ** p < .01 
*** 
 n = 37  
      
The results of my first empirical analysis are given above. As we can see, my 
variable accounting for natural resource wealth is shown to have a significant effect on 
sanctions outcomes. The coefficient for this variable is also positive, which indicates that 
as resource wealth increases so does the settlement outcomes for targeted states. This 
provides evidence for my first hypothesis, which argues that states with resource wealth 
should have increased capacity to survive the implementation of economic sanctions. We 
also see the Cold War, length, and cases variables being statistically significant.  
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Table.2 Empirical Test for Hypothesis 2  
 
Imposition 
 
Coef. 
 
Std. Err. 
 
z 
 
p value 
 
95% confidence 
Natural 
Resource 
Rents (GDP) 
 
-.0305964 
 
.0265939 
 
-0.57 
 
0.127 
 
-.0837742, 
.0225815 
Allies .167403 .0932418  0.90 0.039**   -.0190454, 
.3538515 
Cold War -.0130128 .1300496 -0.05  0.460 -.273063,  
.2470374 
 
IO -.047801 .1340115
  
-0.18  0.361 -.3157735, 
.2201716 
Anticipated 
Sender Costs 
 
 
.2548974 
 
.3610367 
 
 0.35 
 
0.241 
 
-.4670401, 
.9768349 
Anticipated 
Target Costs 
 
.0057734 
 
.1239282 
 
-0.02 
 
0.481 
 
-.253583, 
.2420363 
 
Sender 
Commitment 
 
 
 
.0472749 
 
 
.0913287 
 
 
 0.26 
 
 
0.303 
 
 
-.135348, 
.2298979 
Cases .1520111 .1827249  0.41 0.204 -.21337, 
.5173922 
cons .4390489 .6767605 0.32 0.259 -.9142174, 
1.792315 
p < .1 * p < .05 ** p < .01 *** n = 70   
 
The results of my second analyses are listed above. As we can see the variable 
accounting for natural resource wealth is not significant. It appears that resource wealth 
does not have an effect on the progression of cases from the threat stage to the imposition 
stage. Based on these results I am unable to accept my second hypothesis, which argues 
that nation states with resource wealth are more likely to progress from the threat stage to 
the imposition stage. The only variable we see showing significance is the Allies 
variable. 
46 
 
Table.3  Empirical Test of Hypothesis 3 
Target 
Settlement 
Outcome 
 
Coef. 
 
Std. Err. 
 
t 
 
p value 
 
95% confidence 
Natural 
Resource 
Rents (GDP) 
 
-.0533308    
 
.2020693 
 
-0.13 
 
 
0.397 
 
-.4654539, 
.3587922 
Allies -5.173023 2.784186     -0.93   0.036**     -10.85141, 
.5053609 
 
Cold War  1.225728    1.277515      0.48 0.172     -1.379781, 
3.831237 
Anticipated 
Target Costs 
 
-1.988435    
 
.9438088 
 
-1.05    
 
0.021**     
 
-3.913346, 
.0635244 
 
Sender 
Commitment 
 
 
 
-.4136114    
 
 
.5774825 
 
 
-0.36    
 
 
0.239     
 
 
  -1.591395, 
.764172 
Cases -3.057675    1.455107     -1.05    0.022**      -6.025385, 
.0899644 
cons 14.4333     4.67719      1.54   0.002     4.894109, 
23.97249 
p < .1 * p < .05 ** p < .01 ***   n = 38 
 The results from my third analysis are shown above. As we can see the variable 
accounting for natural resource wealth is once again not significant. This tells us that 
resource-rich states do not seem to act any differently than non-resource-rich states in 
threat stage compromises. There is not sufficient evidence to support my third hypothesis, 
which argues that states with natural resource wealth will concede more than non-
resource-rich states in threat stage compromises. We do, however, see statistical 
significance in my anticipated cost variable as well as dummy variable for the number of 
cases.   
 We can draw several conclusions from these results. First and foremost, my 
analysis provided evidence in support of my first hypothesis. We see that as resource 
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wealth increases, so does the likelihood that a target state will have a better outcome at 
the end of the episode. This supports my overarching theory that natural resource wealth 
increases the capacity of targeted states to persevere sanction implementation. 
 Given the evidence provided, I am unable to affirm my other two hypotheses, 
which dealt with the way in which resource-rich states act during the threat stage of 
economic sanctions. The evidence suggests that states with natural resource wealth are no 
more likely to progress from the threat stage to the implementation stage than states 
without resource wealth. My analysis also provided no evidence that resource-rich states 
act any differently in settlements during the threat stage. A possible explanation for these 
results could be that resource-rich states are unsure if there will be a black knight 
available once sanctions are implemented. This may be a risk leaders are not willing to 
take. Well-placed economic sanctions can be crippling to an economy. The willingness of 
an ally to continue to trade with a targeted state can have a major effect on the severity of 
imposed sanctions. Iran and Iraq may provide a perfect example of this occurring.  
China and Russia have both continued to trade with Iran throughout the currently 
imposed economic sanctions (Eckert, 2010; Ong-Webb, 2009). But Iraq was not so lucky. 
Iraq was cut off by everyone, even OPEC. The Iraqi economy suffered a lot more than 
the Iranian economy (Cordesman, 1999). Given the self-serving nature of the 
international community, states may not be willing to rely on allies to support them 
through the imposition of economic sanctions. So resource-rich nations may not respond 
differently to the threat of economic sanctions than non-resource-rich states. If this is 
true, nations with natural resource wealth may not act any differently than other states 
when they are threatened with the use of economic sanctions.  
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Conclusion and Future Research 
As I have shown, the literature is somewhat divided on the success of economic 
sanctions. Those that oppose their use argue that they are historically ineffective, that 
implementing states are forced to bare economic costs with little chance of any returns. 
Proponents, however, argue that sanctions are very complex and often the threat of their 
use is enough to persuade targeted states to cave to the sender’s demands. But as the 
literature has developed, many have begun to look at the individual characteristics and 
factors that cause economic sanctions to work in some cases, yet fail in others. This is the 
area that I set out to explore further. 
My empirical analysis has provided evidence in support of my first hypothesis, 
that natural resource wealth increases the ability of nations to persevere the 
implementation of economic sanctions. My analysis showed a positive correlation 
between a target state’s resource wealth and the settlement outcomes it received at the 
end of a sanctions episode. But my analysis provided no evidence that natural resource 
wealth has an effect on the way in which targeted states act during the threat stage of 
sanction episodes. This in itself is curious; why do we not see states taking advantage of 
this increased capacity? 
I believe that this piece opens up many different avenues of research that the 
academic community should explore further. In my theoretical argument I suggested that 
the increased capacity of target states that we end up seeing in my empirical model is 
caused by the presence of sanction busters. Basically, states will be more likely to trade 
with targeted states if they have natural resource wealth. I would argue that scholars 
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should look further into the way in which sanction busters interact with sanctioned states. 
This would help determine if my proposed causal mechanism is in fact correct. This 
could also shed some light on why we don’t see states with natural resource wealth acting 
any differently during the threat stage of economic sanctions.  
I would argue that this is an area of study that needs to be further explored by 
scholars. I would contend that future research needs to explore the effects of different 
types of resource wealth on sanction success. The measure I have used here is a broad 
measure, encompassing many different types of natural resources. It can be assumed that 
it may be easier to covertly sell certain resources on their international market than others 
or that certain natural resources will be more lootable than others.  
Finally, I would argue that this analysis should be the first of many studies that 
look into the effects of natural resource wealth on foreign policy in general. This has been 
a largely neglected area of study within the International Relations literature. It is clear 
from other areas of the political science literature that natural resource wealth matters. It 
is clear that the presence of natural resource wealth affects both development and 
domestic politics. So it is only logical to assume that natural resource wealth will also 
have an effect on international politics. I would argue that this is an area that needs to be 
further explored by IR scholars. By doing so I believe we can add to the current literature 
and to our overall understanding of political phenomenon.  
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